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“Infringed” Versus “Infringing”: Different
Interpretations of the Word “Work” and the Effect on
the Deterrence Goal of Copyright Law
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the key elements that courts use to determine an appropriate
statutory damage award in a copyright infringement case is the number
1
of infringements of a copyright.
In most cases, the number of
infringements of a copyright is obvious. For example, if a publishing
company reprints an author’s copyrighted book without her permission,
the author is entitled to one statutory damage award. Similarly, if a
recording company includes one of a composer’s copyrighted songs
without his permission on an album, the composer is entitled to one
statutory damage award. But how does a court determine the number
of infringements when one infringing article has been printed six times
in over one hundred copies of a magazine? Or when one infringing
song has been played by a network radio six times over one hundred
stations? When computing statutory damages in the above scenarios,
does a court count one infringement, six infringements, or one hundred
infringements? The answer depends on the court’s interpretation of the
word “work” in § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act):
“[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover . . . an award of
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with
respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable
2
individually.”
Clearly in the above scenarios, a court’s decision
concerning the number of infringements of a copyright strongly impacts
3
the amount of the statutory damage award.
Before the 1976 Act went into effect, many courts adhered to the
“multiplicity doctrine” and would have awarded statutory damages in
the above scenarios for each of the six times that the infringing article
4
was printed or the infringing song was played. Post–1976, however,
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000).
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. For example, assuming that a judge awards $1000 per infringement, the difference in
interpretations of the word “work” is $5000; that is, $1000 for one infringed work compared
to $6000 for the six infringing works.
4. See Peter Thea, Statutory Damages for the Multiple Infringement of a Copyrighted
Work: A Doctrine Whose Time Has Come, Again, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 463, 474–75
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most courts have interpreted the 1976 Act’s language as abolishing the
practice of awarding statutory damages for each infringing work, instead
5
awarding statutory damages for each infringed work. In 2004, the First
Circuit reaffirmed this interpretation in Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux
6
Records.
Although the law may appear to be well-settled, two
questions remain. First, does this interpretation of the 1976 Act actually
deter prospective infringers—one of the goals of copyright law? And,
second, does this interpretation promote good public policy? Evidence
seems to suggest that the answers to both of these questions are in the
negative.
This Comment, beginning with Part II, gives a brief history of
statutory damages in the United States from the Copyright Act of 1790
(1790 Act), through the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), to § 504(c)(1)
of the 1976 Act. Part III discusses the ambiguous language in the 1909
Act, the confusion that resulted in the courts, and the birth of the
multiplicity doctrine. Part IV discusses the revisions under § 504(c)(1)
of the 1976 Act and the cases that have interpreted the revisions as an
abolition of the multiplicity doctrine. Finally, Part V discusses how the
multiplicity doctrine furthers the deterrence goal of copyright law while
promoting good public policy and suggests that courts return to the
interpretation of the 1976 Act that awards statutory damages for each
infringing work.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATUTORY DAMAGES FOR COPYRIGHT
OWNERS IN THE UNITED STATES
Common law remedies originally compensated copyright owners
7
for copyright infringement. Victims of copyright infringement were
8
entitled only to actual damages and profits. Over time, however,
England and many American colonies adopted statutory damage
(1988) (noting the courts’ shift from basing statutory damage awards on the number of
infringing works to the number of infringed works); see also infra Part III.A. (discussing the
multiplicity doctrine in more detail).
5. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 14.04[E][2][a] (2005) (“Prima facie [the post–1976 interpretations] would appear to
represent a departure from the case law under the 1909 Act, whereby a separate set of
statutory damages (each with its own $250 minimum) was applied to what might be termed
each infringing transaction undertaken by the same defendant.”); see also infra Part IV
(discussing the infringed work interpretation of the 1976 Act in more detail).
6. 370 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2004).
7. See Thea, supra note 4, at 470; see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654–
57 (1834); Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 206 (K.B.).
8. See Thea, supra note 4, at 470 n.32.
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provisions to address the problem that arose when the amount of actual
damages and lost profits caused by a copyright infringement was too
9
difficult to determine. These statutory damage provisions consist of a
10
11
series of three acts: (1) the 1790 Act, (2) the 1909 Act, and (3) the
12
1976 Act.
A. 1790 Act
The first federal copyright statute was the 1790 Act, modeled
13
after England’s Statute of Anne. The 1790 Act was the first statute
that “specifically . . . recognize[d] the rights of authors and the
14
foundation of subsequent legislation on the subject of copyright.”
Over the nineteenth century, scattered pieces of legislation slowly
15
expanded remedies available to copyright owners. These pieces of
16
legislation were finally consolidated in 1909 into a single act.
B. 1909 Act
Under the 1909 Act, copyright owners in infringement actions had
the option of choosing “in lieu of actual damages and profits, such
17
damages as to the court shall appear just.” In addition, the 1909 Act
9. See id.
10. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
11. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000).
13. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 21, § 1 (Eng.). Under the Statute of Anne,
copyright owners were entitled to specific amounts of damages for each infringing copy. Id.
Authors had the right to print books for fourteen years, and infringers were forced to pay one
penny per infringing sheet. Id. Under the 1790 Act, copyright infringers were forced to pay
fifty cents per infringing sheet. Copyright Act of 1790. In addition, infringers were “liable to
suffer and pay to the . . . author or proprietor all damages occasioned by such injury.” Id.
14. WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 4 (6th ed. 1986).
15. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436–39 (protecting the copyrights of
musical compositions); Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (protecting copyright
owner’s performance and publication rights in dramatic works); Copyright Act of 1870, ch.
194, 28 Stat. 965 (protecting copyrighted photographs not made from a work of fine art by
providing for specific remedies); Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (protecting the
copyrights of designs, engravings, and prints).
16. See Copyright Act of 1909.
17. Section 101(b) of the Copyright Act of 1909 further states, in relevant part:
To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor
may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the
infringer shall have made from such infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff
shall be required to prove sales only, and the defendant shall be required to prove
every element of cost which he claims, or in lieu of actual damages and profits, such
damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and assessing such damages the court
may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but in case of a
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provided that two separate infringements of the same copyrighted work
18
Thus,
would result in two separate claims for minimum damages.
copyright infringers were liable to copyright owners for each infringing
19
act of each copyrighted work.
First, however, a court “had to
determine whether the infringer’s acts constituted ‘multiple’
infringements, to each of which a statutory minimum award would
attach, or continuous infringements (of the original act of infringement),
20
to which only one statutory award would attach.” In addition, the 1909
Act set out four “yardstick provisions,” that is, guidelines for a court to
21
use at its discretion when calculating statutory damages. One court
interpreted these provisions as suggesting that “one ‘infringement’ may
newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph, such damages shall not
exceed the sum of $200 nor be less than the sum of $50, and in the case of the
infringement of an undramatized or nondramatic work by means of motion pictures,
where the infringer shall show that he was not aware that he was infringing, and that
such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen, such damages shall not
exceed the sum of $100; and in the case of an infringement of a copyrighted
dramatic or dramatico-musical work by a maker of motion pictures and his agencies
for distribution thereof to exhibitors, where such infringer shows that he was not
aware that he was infringing a copyrighted work, and that such infringements could
not reasonably have been foreseen, the entire sum of damages recoverable by the
copyright proprietor from such infringing maker and his agencies for the distribution
to exhibitors of such infringing motion picture shall not exceed the sum of $5,000
nor be less than $250, and such damages shall in no other case exceed the sum of
$5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and shall not be regarded as a penalty. But
the foregoing exceptions shall not deprive the copyright proprietor of any other
remedy given him under this law, nor shall the limitation as to the amount of
recovery apply to infringements occurring after the actual notice to a defendant,
either by service of process in a suit or other written notice served upon him.
First. In the case of a painting, statute, or sculpture, $10 for every infringing
copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or
employees;
Second. In the case of any work enumerated in section 5 of this title, except a
painting, statute, or sculpture, $1 for every infringing copy made or sold by or found
in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees;
Third. In the case of a lecture, sermon, or address, $50 for every infringing
delivery;
Fourth. In the case of a dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or orchestral
composition, $100 for the first and $50 for every subsequent infringing performance;
in the case of other musical compositions, $10 for every infringing performance[.]
Copyright Act of 1909 § 101(b).
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Thea, supra note 4, at 468.
21. See Copyright Act of 1909 § 101(b). For example, one of the guidelines
recommends that a defendant pay ten dollars for every infringing copy of a painting, statue,
or sculpture. Another guideline recommends that a defendant pay fifty dollars for every
“infringing delivery” of a lecture, sermon, or address. Id.
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nevertheless result in more than one ‘performance’ and that in fixing
damages for such infringement between the $250 minimum and the
$5000 maximum, the court may consider the number of infringing
22
performances and the suggested yardstick amount for each one.”
Although the 1909 Act consolidated scattered pieces of copyright
legislation into a single act, it was so problematic that one judge
23
described it as “an ambiguous hodgepodge of improvisations.” As a
24
result, the legislature revised the Copyright Act once again in 1976.
C. 1976 Act
The 1976 Act attempted to resolve the ambiguities surrounding
25
the 1909 Act, particularly the damages provisions. Like the 1909 Act,
the 1976 Act provides that a copyright owner can choose to recover
26
statutory damages for copyright infringement in lieu of actual damages.
Unlike the 1909 Act, however, the 1976 Act provides that statutory
damage awards include “all infringements involved in the action, with
respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable
27
individually.”
The purpose of the 1976 Act’s statutory damage
provision was to provide courts with direction when calculating
statutory damage awards, thereby avoiding the confusion caused by the
28
1909 Act. This language has still proven to be ambiguous, however, as
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Id. at 331; see also PATRY, supra note 14, at 10.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000).
See PATRY, supra note 14, at 12.
Section 504(c)(1), states, in relevant part:
Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may
elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in
the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable
individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally,
in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.
§ 504(c)(1).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5777–78. House Report 1476 states that the goals of the damage award provisions of the
Copyright Act of 1976 are as follows:
(1) to give the courts specific unambiguous directions concerning monetary awards,
thus avoiding the confusion and uncertainty that have marked the present law on
the subject, and, at the same time, (2) to provide the courts with reasonable latitude
to adjust recovery to the circumstances of the case, thus avoiding some of the
artificial or overly technical awards resulting from the language of the existing
statute.
Id.
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post–1976 courts have interpreted the word “work” to mean both
infringing works (allowing for statutory damage awards for multiple
29
infringements of a copyrighted work), as well as infringed works
(allowing for only one statutory damage award for each work
30
infringed). In an effort to interpret the meaning of the 1976 Act, some
31
frustrated courts have looked to its legislative history. Other courts
have focused on public policies, such as restitution, reparation, and
32
deterrence, when interpreting the 1976 Act. Despite the continuing
ambiguity surrounding the 1976 Act, the growing trend among the
courts, as exemplified by the First Circuit’s decision in VenegasHernandez, has been to interpret the word “work” to mean infringed
33
work, thereby abolishing the multiplicity doctrine.

29. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. 531, 535 (D. Me. 1987)
(awarding statutory damages based on the number of infringing performances of copyrighted
music); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
114, 118–20 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (awarding statutory damages based on the number of infringing
commercials, promotional items, and personal appearances by the defendants); Milene
Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 n.14 (D.R.I. 1982) (awarding statutory
damages for the infringement of copyrighted songs based on the number of infringing
performances of those songs); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
475 F. Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (awarding statutory damages based on the number of
infringing broadcasts of a copyrighted film).
30. See, e.g., Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 2004)
(awarding statutory damages based on the two infringed songs on sixteen different albums);
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (awarding statutory damages
based on the two infringed copyrights of Mickey and Minnie Mouse in six different poses);
RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (refusing to allow
multiple statutory damage awards for both the infringed graphics for the recording and the
recording itself).
31. See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 161.
Although . . . an award of minimum statutory damages may be multiplied if separate
works and separately liable infringers are involved in the suit, a single award . . . is to
be made “for all infringements involved in the action.” A single infringer of a single
work is liable for a single amount . . . , no matter how many acts of infringement are
involved in the action and regardless of whether the acts were separate, isolated, or
occurred in a related series.
Id.
32. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952);
Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1978);
United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1481 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
See also Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 139 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(considering such factors as “the time interval between succeeding publications; whether
separate transactions generated were the same or different parties involved[]; were there new
business arrangements made for each successive publication; were the succeeding
publications made in the same or different locales?”).
33. See Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 186.
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III. CONFUSION IN THE COURTS SURROUNDING THE 1909 ACT
The first Supreme Court case under the 1909 Act to recognize
statutory damages for the multiple infringements of a copyrighted work
34
was L.A. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co. in 1919. In this case,
the Court held that the unauthorized publication of six copyrighted
illustrations that appeared in two advertisements in a newspaper
35
resulted in six separate claims for minimum statutory damages. In its
decision, the Court emphasized the fact that two different advertisers
36
had sponsored each of the two publications.
However, the Court
explicitly left open the question of whether, for purposes of computing
minimum damages, multiple infringements would arise if the additional
37
publications were “merely a continuation or repetition of the first.” As
a result, lower courts followed both the infringing interpretation of the
1909 Act and the infringed interpretation.
A. The Multiplicity Doctrine: The “Infringing” Work Interpretation
Under the 1909 Act
The multiplicity doctrine, which dictated that courts should award
statutory damages for multiple infringements of a copyrighted work,
38
grew out of the ambiguity surrounding the 1909 Act. Although the
multiplicity doctrine allowed for larger statutory damage awards, the
39
awards were not arbitrary. Instead, many courts used a combination of
several factors to compute statutory damage awards, including (1) the
gross revenues of the infringer’s business and the size of the infringer’s
40
business, (2) the proximity in time of the repeated infringements and
41
the heterogeneity of the infringements, and (3) the “willfulness” of the

34. 249 U.S. 100 (1919).
35. Id. at 105–06. Five of the six illustrations were published once and the other one
twice. Id. The two advertisements that used the same infringing illustration were done by
different artists and were separated by twenty-six days. Id. at 103.
36. Id. at 105 (noting that “[b]y publishing their advertisements, the defendant
participated in their independent infringements. . . . [W]e think the second publication of the
illustration must be regarded as another and distinct case of infringement”).
37. Id. at 106.
38. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
39. See discussion infra Part III.A.1–3.
40. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. 531, 535 n.2 (D. Me. 1987)
(considering the gross revenue from liquor and food sales at the infringer’s business when
computing the amount of the statutory damage award); Burndy Eng’g Co. v. Penn-Union
Elec. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 671, 672 (W.D. Pa. 1940) (considering the “general nature of [the]
defendant’s business” and the gross sales when computing statutory damage award).
41. See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1102–04 (2d Cir.
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defendant’s infringements.

42

1. Gross Sales of the Infringer’s Business and Size of the Infringer’s
Business
The greater the gross sales and size of the infringer’s business, the
greater the need for a large statutory damage award to deter
prospective infringers. Courts that recognize this fact have awarded
statutory damages based on the number of infringing acts under the
43
multiplicity doctrine.
44
For example, in the 1987 case Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Larkin,
the court took into account the size of the infringer’s business when it
awarded statutory damages of $1500 for each of the nine infringing
45
acts. The defendants, owners of a Portland restaurant and nightclub,
had infringed the plaintiff’s exclusive public performance copyrights to
46
several copyrighted musical compilations. When awarding statutory
damages, the court noted that the gross revenue from liquor and food
47
sales at the defendant’s business totaled $281,809. By doing so, the
court implied that awarding statutory damages for each infringing act
for a total of $13,500 would be more likely to deter the defendants from
48
committing further acts of infringement than a single $1500 award.

1976) (considering that the forty-eight separate infringements were in different cities, as well
as that each had a specific negotiated agreement and different financial terms); Iowa State
Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 475 F. Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(considering that nineteen months separated each infringement under the time test, as well as
that the infringements that were closest together were “broadcast to different audiences
during different parts of the day for different purposes”).
42. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952)
(holding that a large statutory damage award not only “compels restitution of profit and
reparation for injury but also is designed to discourage wrongful conduct”); Lottie Joplin
Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that courts
have “broad discretion to make awards which serve the recognized compensatory and
deterrent objectives of the Act”); Hosp. for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre,
516 F. Supp. 67, 72 (E.D. Va. 1980) (considering that the defendant had written, directed, and
applied for the copyright for the play as well as obtained licenses to perform other musicals in
the past in determining that the infringements were “willful”).
43. See, e.g., Larkin, 672 F. Supp. at 535; Burndy Eng’g Co., 32 F. Supp. at 672.
44. 672 F. Supp. 531 (D. Me. 1987).
45. Id. at 535.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 535 n.2.
48. Id. at 535. The court stated that it is “guided by the purposes of the Copyright Act,
which include restitution of wrongfully acquired gains to prevent unjust enrichment of the
defendant, reparation for injury done to the plaintiff, and deterrence of further wrongful
conduct by defendant and others.” Id.

ZAWADA ARTICLE - FORMATTED

2006]

“INFRINGED” VERSUS “INFRINGING”

4/24/2006 6:52:27 AM

137

Similarly, in the 1940 case Burndy Engineering Co. v. Penn-Union
49
Electric Corp., the court took into account the “general nature of [the]
defendant’s business” when it awarded statutory damages for each of
the fourteen infringements contained in six separate printings of the
50
defendant’s trade catalogues. In addition, the court took into account
the defendant corporation’s gross sales of over $52,000 of items
contained in the infringing printings of the trade catalogues when
51
awarding statutory damages for each infringing act. In conjunction
with the gross sales of the infringer’s business and the size of the
infringer’s business, courts also consider the proximity in time of the
repeated infringements and the heterogeneity of the infringements
under the multiplicity doctrine.
2. Proximity in Time of the Repeated Infringements and Heterogeneity
of the Infringements
Other courts have used the “time” and the “heterogeneity” factors
when computing statutory damage awards under the multiplicity
52
doctrine. When considering the “time” factor, the court “looks to the
proximity in time of repeated infringements in deciding whether to treat
53
them as multiple infringements or as one continuing infringement.”
When considering the “heterogeneity” factor, the court “looks to
differences between the advertisers, financial arrangements, locales,
audiences, and other significant variables” in deciding whether to treat
the infringements as multiple infringements or a continuing
54
infringement.
Professor Nimmer has also noted that courts have consistently used
“time” and “heterogeneity” as deciding factors in cases decided under
the 1909 Act:
[I]f the interval between succeeding publications is a matter of
days, the courts were inclined to consider all such publications as
part of a single infringing transaction, requiring but a single
minimum damages award. If the interval between succeeding
publications was for a substantially longer period, then the courts

49. 32 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
50. Id. at 672.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1102–03 (2d Cir.
1976); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 475 F. Supp. 78, 82
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
53. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., 475 F. Supp. at 82.
54. Id.
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viewed each publication as giving rise to a separate claim for at
55
least minimum damages.
The case that most clearly articulated the importance of the “time” and
the “heterogeneity” factors in computing statutory damage awards was
Iowa State University Research Foundation v. American Broadcasting
56
Cos. in 1979.
In Iowa State University Research Foundation, Iowa State brought an
action for copyright infringement against American Broadcasting
Companies (ABC), alleging that ABC had infringed its copyright on a
student-produced film about Olympic wrestler Dan Gable by airing it
57
on national television during ABC’s 1972 Olympic Games telecast.
While Iowa State argued that ABC had committed four separate acts of
58
infringement, ABC argued that its various uses of the film constituted
59
only one infringement. The court ultimately agreed with Iowa State,
holding that “the time test alone mandates a finding of four separate
infringements” because more than nineteen months separated each of
60
the infringements.
In addition, the court found four separate
infringements under the “heterogeneity” test because those
infringements which were “closest together in time were broadcast to
different audiences during different parts of the day for different
61
purposes.”
Similarly, the court considered the “time” and the “heterogeneity”
factors when computing statutory damages in the 1976 case Robert

55. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.04[E][2][a].
56. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., 475 F. Supp. at 82.
57. Id. at 80.
58. Iowa State argued that the four separate acts of infringement included the
following:
(1) [T]he initial copying of “Champion” in early August, 1972, for later use; (2) the
broadcast of a seven-to-twelve second segment on August 25, 1972 as part of ABC’s
Olympic preview; (3) the broadcast of a two and one-half minute segment on
August 27 during ABC’s live Olympic coverage from Munich; and (4) the broadcast
of an eight second segment in February, 1974 as part of ABC’s “Superstars”
program.
Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 82 (noting that “at least two days and as much as nineteen months separate
each of these infringements from one another, the time test alone mandates a finding of four
separate infringements”). In addition, the court stated that “[i]n determining the number of
times a defendant has infringed upon protected work, common sense provides the surest
guide.” Id. at 81–82.
61. Id. at 82.
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62

Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants, Roman Catholic priests, infringed plaintiffs’ copyright
by performing the rock opera “Jesus Christ Superstar” without a
63
license.
The Second Circuit held that the forty-eight infringing
performances of the rock opera constituted forty-eight separate
infringements because they were a “series of disconnected one-night or
64
two-night stands in different cities.”
In addition, each of the
defendants’ performances was made after a separate, specific negotiated
agreement, and each of the financial arrangements contained different
65
66
terms.
Although the court considered other tests, it ultimately
decided that “when the components of the infringing activity are
heterogeneous, the presumption is that each infringing activity is a
67
separate infringement.” In addition to the gross sales of an infringer’s
business, the size of an infringer’s business, the proximity in time of the
repeated infringements, and the heterogeneity of the infringements,
courts also consider the “willfulness” of the defendant’s infringements
under the multiplicity doctrine.
3. The “Willfulness” of the Defendant’s Infringements
Most courts considered the “willfulness” of the defendant’s
infringements when computing statutory damage awards under the
68
multiplicity doctrine because it was a factor articulated in the 1909 Act.
Plaintiffs can prove willfulness by showing either that the defendant
actually knew that he or she was infringing the plaintiff’s copyright or
69
recklessly disregarded the possibility that he or she might be infringing.
62. 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
63. Id. at 1097.
64. Id. at 1103.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1102–03 (noting that it did “not conceive any reasonable test that would
make the forty-eight United States performances but a single infringement”).
67. Id. at 1103.
68. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952);
Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1978); Hosp.
for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67, 72 (E.D. Va. 1980). See
also Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (setting maximum statutory damage awards
in cases “where the infringer shall show that he was not aware that he was infringing, and that
such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen”).
69. For examples in which the court required actual knowledge, see Fitzgerald Publ’g
Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986), and Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc.,
638 F. Supp. 983, 986 (E.D. Pa. 1986). See also Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370
F.3d 183, 196 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that the defendant’s reckless disregard for the possibility
of infringement constituted willfulness).
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The “willfulness” of the defendant’s infringements is a factor that is
integral to courts’ computation of statutory damage awards because
70
deterrence is one of the main goals of copyright law. The deterrence
rationale “focuses on the inequity of permitting the defendant to keep
his gains, rather than on the concept that the gains belong to the
71
plaintiff.” Courts consider a number of factors in connection with the
deterrence rationale, including “the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct; the extent of the defendant’s contribution in the exploitation of
the property; the importance of the property right the defendant
appropriated; and justifications for granting the plaintiff a windfall in
72
the amount recovered.”
For example, in the 1980 case Hospital for Sick Children v. Melody
73
Fare Dinner Theatre, the plaintiffs, owners of the copyright for the play
“Peter Pan or The Boy Who Would Not Grow Up,” claimed that the
defendants’ play, entitled “Peter Pan, The Magical Musical,” infringed
74
their copyright. The court considered the defendants’ gross profits and
the willfulness of the defendants’ actions when it awarded the plaintiffs
fifty dollars for each of the fifty performances, for a total statutory
75
damage award of $10,000. In determining that the infringement had
been committed willfully by the defendant author of the infringing
musical, the court considered that she had written the musical, directed
its performance, applied for its copyright, and obtained licenses to
76
perform other musicals in the past. “Willfulness” is such an integral
factor in the computation of statutory damage awards that it has
survived the abolition of the multiplicity doctrine and is still used by
post–1976 courts.
B. The “Infringed” Work Interpretation Under the 1909 Act
Not all cases decided under the 1909 Act favored the plaintiffs by
awarding multiple statutory damage awards under the multiplicity
77
doctrine. Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co. in 1966 was the first
case with binding precedent on the issue of whether a network telecast
70. See Andrew W. Coleman, Copyright Damages and the Value of the Infringing Use:
Restitutionary Recovery in Copyright Infringement Actions, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 91, 104–05 (1993).
71. Id. at 104.
72. Id.
73. 516 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1980).
74. Id. at 68–69.
75. Id. at 72–73.
76. Id. at 72, 74.
77. 249 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

ZAWADA ARTICLE - FORMATTED

2006]

4/24/2006 6:52:27 AM

“INFRINGED” VERSUS “INFRINGING”

141
78

over multiple stations constituted multiple infringements. The court
ultimately held that the telecast by 162 stations of an infringed television
program constituted a single infringement by the defendants, not 162
79
separate infringements. However, the court was influenced by the
absence of a ceiling on the statutory amount that it could award for
willful infringement in cases when notice was given, holding that it was
unnecessary to apply a rigid multiple infringement rule, which may
result in liability for innocent infringers who did not know that they had
80
infringed a copyright. The Davis court held that the plaintiff had given
the defendants the proper requisite notice and awarded the plaintiff
81
$25,000 in statutory damages for one infringed work.
The Davis decision had a tremendous impact on the broadcasting
82
industry. No longer could network broadcasters be liable for multiple
infringements of a copyrighted work resulting from a single,
83
simultaneous telecast.
In addition, the motion picture industry
recognized that the logical extension of the Davis case was to apply this
84
rationale to multiple showings of an infringed motion picture. While

78. Id. at 338.
79. Id. at 349.
80. Id. at 341 (stating that “if such notice has been given, a multiplication of
infringements to pile up high minimum statutory damages and (by hypothesis) a more
equitable damage figure is not necessary because the court is not bound by the maximum of
$5,000”).
81. Id. at 349.
82. See Thea, supra note 4, at 486 (noting that the Davis case “quashed the fears within
the broadcasting industry. . . . [because] network broadcasts would not support a claim for
multiple infringement of a copyrighted work”).
83. Davis, 249 F. Supp. at 342–43. The court offered the following explanation:
On balance, it seems preferable, for the purpose of applying the statutory damage
provisions, to regard the simultaneous network telecast here as one infringement by
the network and these co-defendants, rather than many. This preserves flexibility,
avoids the possibility of a ridiculous and injurious award in other cases and is the
result at least suggested by the cases and the statute.
Id.
84. A representative of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. stated the
following:
[W]here production of a motion picture or a network radio or TV broadcast
infringes a copyrighted work, there should be reasonable limitation on statutory
damage liability for the multiple infringements inevitably flowing from the original
infringement when the motion picture is infringingly exhibited in each of thousands
of theatres, or the broadcast is infringingly relayed by each station in the network.
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW (PART 2) 365 (Comm. Print 1963) (statement of Edward A. Sargoy,
Counsel to the Copyright Committee of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.).
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most post–1976 courts have followed this decision and awarded
statutory damage awards for each infringed work, they have focused on
different factors discussed below in Part IV.
IV. THE “INFRINGED” WORK INTERPRETATION UNDER THE 1976 ACT
The 1976 Act shifted the focus of statutory damage awards from the
85
number of infringing works to the number of infringed works.
Although the 1976 Act did not define the word “work,” several courts
have held that a distinct “work” must be able to live its own copyright
86
life. This interpretation focuses on whether each infringed copyright
87
has “independent economic value.” In addition, post–1976 courts still
88
consider the “willfulness” of the defendant’s infringement.
A. Independent Economic Value Test
Several courts have addressed the question of whether each episode
89
of a television series constitutes a separate work under § 504(c)(1).
Most have answered this question in the affirmative, holding that each
90
episode of a television series has independent economic value.
For example, in the 1993 case Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean91
Chea, the court considered whether four individual episodes of a
television series constituted four separate works or a single work for
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; see
also Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that
the 1976 Act “shifts the unit of damages inquiry from number of infringements to number of
works”).
86. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106
F.3d 284, 288 (9th Cir. 1997); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766, 769 (11th Cir.
1996); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 136 (5th Cir. 1992); Gamma Audio &
Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc., 996 F.2d
at 1380–81; Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Robert Stigwood
Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976); Phillips v. Kidsoft, L.L.C., 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (D. Md. 1999).
87. See Columbia Pictures Television, 106 F.3d at 288; MCA Television Ltd., 89 F.3d at
769; Mason, 967 F.2d at 136; Gamma Audio & Video, Inc., 11 F.3d at 1116; Twin Peaks
Prods., Inc., 996 F.2d at 1380–81; Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 567; O’Reilly, 530 F.2d at 1105;
Phillips, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
88. See, e.g., Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990);
Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United Feature Syndicate,
Inc. v. Spree, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Lauratex Textile Corp. v.
Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
89. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television, 106 F.3d at 295; Gamma Audio & Video,
Inc., 11 F.3d at 1116–17; Twin Peaks Prods., Inc., 996 F.2d at 1380–81.
90. See sources cited supra note 89.
91. 11 F.3d 1106 (1st Cir. 1993).
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92

purposes of awarding statutory damages. The district court held that
the four individual episodes constituted a single work because the
copyright holder sold or rented only complete sets of the series to video
stores and because the copyrights for the four episodes were all
93
registered on one form. The First Circuit disagreed, however, holding
that each episode constituted a separate work and that the plaintiff was
94
entitled to four separate statutory damages awards. In its decision, the
court emphasized that each episode of the series was independently
95
produced and independently aired on television.
Similarly, in the 1997 case Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton
96
Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that each
infringed episode of a television series constituted a separate work
where “different episodes were broadcast over the course of weeks,
97
months, and years.” “[T]he episodes could be repeated and broadcast
in different orders [and were] separately written, produced, and
98
registered.” Thus, the court held that each episode of the series had
99
independent economic value. Finally, in the 1996 case MCA Television
100
Ltd. v. Feltner, the court upheld one of the largest judgments ever for
101
The
statutory damages against a copyright infringer: $9 million.
defendant argued that the court should award damages for each series
broadcast, as opposed to each episode, and that “industry practice” was
to enter into contracts for a television series, not the individual episodes
102
of a series.
Thus, the defendant argued, an individual episode of a
series does not have independent economic value and is not a separate
103
work.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, however, and awarded
damages for each episode of a series broadcast as a separate “work,”

92. Id. at 1115.
93. Id. at 1117.
94. Id. at 1118. The court found significant “the fact that (1) viewers who rent the
tapes from their local video stores may rent as few or as many tapes as they want, many view
one, two, or twenty episodes in a single setting, and may never watch or rent all of the
episodes; and (2) each episode in the . . . series was separately produced.” Id. at 1117.
95. Id. at 1117–18.
96. 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997).
97. See id. at 295. The licensed television series at issue in this case include “Who’s the
Boss?,” “Silver Spoons,” “Hart to Hart,” and “T.J. Hooker.” Id. at 288.
98. Id. at 295.
99. Id.
100. 89 F.3d 766 (11th Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 771.
102. Id. at 769.
103. Id.
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holding that the copyright owners’ “decision . . . to sell television series
as a block, rather than as individual shows, in no way indicates that each
104
episode in a series is unable to stand alone.”
By contrast, in several cases involving multiple infringements of a
copyrighted work, courts have held that each work did not have
105
independent economic value.
For example, in the 1990 case Walt
106
Disney Co. v. Powell, the D.C. Circuit held that the defendant, a
souvenir business owner, had infringed two copyrights of Mickey and
Minnie Mouse in six different poses, as opposed to twelve copyrights in
107
twelve different poses.
The court held that although Mickey and
Minnie are “distinct, viable works with separate economic value and
108
copyright lives of their own,” the six different poses are not. The court
further held that both the text of the 1976 Act and the Act’s legislative
history make it clear that damages should be awarded for a single work
regardless of how many acts of infringement are involved in the
109
action.
110
Similarly, in the 1999 case Phillips v. Kidsoft, L.L.C., the plaintiff
argued that the defendant should pay statutory damages for each of the
111
thirty infringed mazes copied from the plaintiff’s five maze books. On
the one hand, if each of the thirty mazes copied by the defendant
qualified as a “work,” the plaintiff would be entitled to thirty separate
112
statutory damage awards. On the other hand, if each of the five maze
books qualified as a “work,” the plaintiff would be entitled to only five
113
statutory damage awards.
The court acknowledged that each maze
would qualify as a separate “work” under § 504(c)(1) only if each maze
114
were separately copyrighted and had “independent economic value.”
However, it was irrelevant in this particular case whether the copied

104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 136–41 (5th Cir. 1992);
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Phillips v. Kidsoft, L.L.C., 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102, 1106 (D. Md. 1999).
106. 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
107. Id. at 567, 570.
108. Id. at 570 (noting that “Mickey is still Mickey whether he is smiling or frowning,
running or walking, waving his left hand or his right”). Thus, the court held that the
defendant’s mouse face shirts had infringed only two of Disney’s works. Id.
109. Id. at 569.
110. 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (D. Md. 1999).
111. Id. at 1106.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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mazes had separate economic value because they were not individually
115
copyrighted. Thus, the court awarded the plaintiff statutory damages
116
based on the five maze books.
117
Finally, in the 1992 case Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff could not recover statutory damages for
118
each of the 233 infringing real estate ownership maps.
Instead, the
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to statutory damages for only
one copyrighted work because each of the 233 real estate maps did not
119
have independent economic value. In addition, the court offered this
hypothetical example to illustrate the effect of § 504(c)(1):
So if a plaintiff proves that one defendant committed five
separate infringements of one copyrighted work, that plaintiff is
entitled to only one award of statutory damages ranging from
$500 to $20,000. And if a plaintiff proves that two different
defendants each committed five separate infringements of five
120
different works, the plaintiff is entitled to ten awards, not fifty.
Thus, courts that have considered the independent economic value
of a work have consistently held that statutory damage awards should
121
be based on the number of infringed works. In addition, many courts
that have considered the “willfulness” of the defendant’s infringements
have also held that statutory damage awards should be based on the
122
number of infringed works.
B. “Willfulness” of the Defendant’s Infringements . . . Revisited
Just as pre–1976 courts considered the “willfulness” of the
defendant’s infringements as a significant factor in computing statutory

115. Id. The copyright registration certificates issued to the plaintiff in this case were
issued only for the five maze books, not the individual mazes. Id.
116. Id. at 1107.
117. 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992).
118. Id. at 136.
119. See id. at 144.
120. Id. at 143–44.
121. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc.,
106 F.3d 284, 288 (9th Cir. 1997); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766, 769 (11th Cir.
1996); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 996 F.2d 1366, 1380–81 (2d Cir. 1993); Gamma
Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993); Mason, 967 F.2d at 136;
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd.
v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976); Phillips v. Kidsoft, L.L.C., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1102, 1106 (D. Md. 1999).
122. See, e.g., Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.
1990); RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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damage awards, so too do post–1976 courts.
The 1976 Act has
interpreted “willful” to mean “with knowledge that the defendant’s
124
To rebut evidence of
conduct constitutes copyright infringement.”
willful infringement, a defendant “must not only establish its good faith
belief in the innocence of its conduct, it must also show that it was
125
reasonable in holding such a belief.” In copyright infringement cases
in which the defendant blatantly infringed or committed multiple
infringements, courts have awarded plaintiffs more than the statutory
126
maximum.
127
For example, in the 1984 case RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, the court
interpreted the language of § 504(c)(1) as prohibiting plaintiffs from
recovering multiple statutory damage awards for both the infringing
128
graphics for a recording and the actual recording itself.
Nor could
plaintiffs recover separate statutory damage awards for both infringing
129
tapes and records.
However, as a result of the willfulness of the
defendant’s infringements, the court awarded the then-maximum
130
statutory damage award of $50,000 for each infringement. Thus, the
total statutory damage award as a result of the defendant’s willful
131
infringements was $1.45 million.
Similarly, in the 1990 case Peer
132
International Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that
the defendant’s conduct of ignoring the plaintiff’s revocation of a license

123. See supra Part III.C.3 for a discussion of pre–1976 courts’ treatment of the
“willfulness” factor.
124. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.04[B][3]; see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)
(2000) (stating that “[i]n a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving,
and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may
increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000”).
125. Peer Int’l Corp., 909 F.2d at 1336.
126. See, e.g., id. (court awarded $50,000 for each infringed work for a total of $4
million); RSO Records, Inc., 596 F. Supp. at 862–63 (court awarded $50,000 for each infringed
sound recording but not for both the sound recording and the graphic for the sound
recording); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Spree, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (court awarded $50,000 for each infringed t-shirt heat transfer); Lauratex Textile Corp.
v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court awarded statutory
damages of $40,000 when actual damages were only $5000).
127. 596 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
128. Id. at 862 n.16.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 862–63. The 1976 Act originally provided for a maximum amount of $50,000
in statutory damage awards in the event that the defendant willfully infringed; however, this
amount was amended to $100,000 on October 31, 1988, under § 13 and to $150,000 on
December 9, 1999, under § 4.
131. Id. at 863.
132. Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990).
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was unreasonable, and its further use of the copyrighted works was
133
Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s then-maximum
willful.
statutory damage award of $50,000 for each of the eighty infringed
works for a total of $4 million in damages based on the willfulness of the
134
defendant’s infringements. Although both of the courts in the abovementioned cases awarded large statutory damage awards as a result of
the defendants’ willful conduct in an effort to deter prospective
infringers, the court in Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records failed to
do so, as discussed below in Part V.
V. THE MULTIPLICITY DOCTRINE: FURTHERING THE GOALS OF
COPYRIGHT LAW
135

In the 2004 case Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, the
plaintiffs, children and heirs of the famous Puerto Rican composer
Guillermo Venegas-Lloveras, filed a copyright infringement action
136
against Sonolux Records, a United States recording company.
The
plaintiffs had inherited the copyrights to 197 of Venegas-Lloveras’
137
songs. “Sonolux had published recordings of two of the copyrighted
138
songs . . . on sixteen different albums . . . .” The plaintiffs claimed that
they were entitled to statutory damages multiplied by the number of
139
albums (sixteen) containing the infringed songs.
The district court awarded the plaintiffs $1.6 million in statutory
damages for the infringement of the two songs on sixteen different
140
albums, that is, $100,000 for each album.
On appeal, however, the
First Circuit found the damages calculation to have been made in error
and followed the recent trend among courts of abolishing the
141
multiplicity doctrine. Interpreting the word “work” in the 1976 Act to
mean infringed works (two), the court reduced the statutory damages
142
award from $1.6 million to $200,000, that is, $100,000 for each song.
133. Id. at 1336.
134. Id.
135. 370 F.3d 183, 185 (1st Cir. 2004).
136. Id. at 185.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 185–86. The two copyrighted songs that Sonolux published were “Desde
Que Te Marchaste” (“Since You Went Away”) and “No Me Digan Cobarde” (“Don’t Call
Me a Coward”). Id. at 186 & n.1.
139. Plaintiffs in this case brought claims for statutory damages, rather than actual
damages, and for defendant’s profits for all sixteen albums. Id. at 186.
140. Id. at 186.
141. Id. at 194–95.
142. Id. at 195. In addition, the First Circuit held that “‘works’ in § 504(c)(1) means
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The ruling in the Venegas-Hernandez case illustrates two problems
with the abolition of the multiplicity doctrine. First, the outcome does
not further one of the main goals of copyright law—the deterrence of
143
prospective infringers.
After reversing the district court, the First
Circuit did not simply remand the case with instructions to enter the
144
$200,000 award as judgment. Instead, it acknowledged that the 1976
Act was designed to deter willful infringement by using the “sliding
scale” of statutory damages and noted the possibility that on remand the
145
judge may award the statutory maximum of $150,000 per song. The
court appeared to rely on the “sliding scale” of statutory damages as a
146
justification for substantially reducing the statutory damage award.
By doing so, the court dismissed any concerns that the amount of
statutory damages may not actually deter potential infringers and
147
further one of the main goals of the 1976 Act.
Assuming that on
remand, the court did award the statutory maximum of $150,000 for
each infringed song for a total of $300,000, would this amount really
deter potential infringers? The answer depends on the amount of
revenue the infringers received from the infringement, that is, whether it
is financially “worth it” to infringe. In this case, just one of the sixteen
148
records that contained infringed songs sold over five million copies.
Forcing Sonolux to pay $200,000 or even $300,000 for producing a
record that presumably made over $50 million is not likely to have the
deterrent effect that the 1976 Act intended.
The second problem with the court’s decision in Venegas-Hernandez
is that it fails to address the potential judicial economy issue that may
‘songs’ in the context of this case.” Id. at 194.
143. See Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, L.L.C., No. Civ. A.03-4962, 2005 WL
67077, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2005) (“Statutory damages serve the dual purpose of
compensation and deterrence: they compensate the plaintiff for the infringement of its
copyright; and they deter future infringements by punishing the defendant for its actions.”).
144. See Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 194–95.
145. Id. at 195. The court stated the following:
At the $100,000 per “work” rate set by the original judge, the corrected calculation
would automatically produce a reduction in the judgment to $200,000. However, it
may be that the first judge would have increased the amount of damages per work,
given the number of infringements and given his finding of willfulness, if he had
understood that “works” referred to the infringed songs rather than the infringing
albums.
Id.
146. See id.
147. See supra Parts III.A.3, IV.B.
148. See Rafael Venegas, RIAA Lawsuits—RIAA Behavior,
http://www.p2pnet.net/article/8070 (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
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occur when plaintiffs discover that their only option to achieve multiple
statutory damage awards is to file multiple lawsuits. In fact, the First
Circuit acknowledged the potential problem of “game-playing” that
may result from its interpretation of § 504(c)(1) as well as various
149
possible solutions to that problem.
However, it stated that the
150
problem was “beyond the scope of this opinion” and summarily
dismissed it. These two problems with the court’s decision in VenegasHernandez illustrate the two advantages of the multiplicity doctrine:
First, it furthers the deterrence goal of copyright law; and second, it
promotes good public policy.
A. The Multiplicity Doctrine Furthers the Deterrence Goal of Copyright
Law
The United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to
enact laws “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
151
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
When a copyright
owner’s “exclusive right” has been infringed, federal law allows for
152
damages for the purpose of deterring future acts of infringement.
Although the 1976 Act allows for a copyright owner to recover actual
damages from the infringements, Congress has acknowledged that
plaintiffs and courts often have difficulty determining the amount of
153
actual damages. Thus, statutory damages are an alternative way not
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 193.
Id. at 194.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000).
See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
102–03 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 REPORT].
The need for this special remedy arises from the acknowledged inadequacy of actual
damages and profits in many cases:
• The value of a copyright is, by its nature, difficult to establish, and the loss caused
by an infringement is equally hard to determine. As a result, actual damages are
often conjectural, and may be impossible or prohibitively expensive to prove.
• In many cases, especially those involving public performances, the only direct loss
that could be proven is the amount of a license fee. An award of such an amount
would be an invitation to infringe with no rise of loss to the infringer.
• The actual damages capable of proof are often less than the cost to the copyright
owner of detecting and investigating infringements.
• An award of the infringer’s profits would often be equally inadequate. There may
have been little or no profit, or it may be impossible to compute the amount of
profits attributable to the infringement. Frequently, the infringer’s profits will not
be an adequate measure of the injury caused to the copyright owner.
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only to compensate the copyright owner for lost profits and
unascertainable actual damages, but also to deter future willful
154
infringements.
The court in Venegas-Hernandez acknowledged that the 1976 Act
155
was designed to deter willful infringements.
In addition, the First
Circuit noted that the district court had concluded that the
infringements were willful and that Sonolux’s conduct “demonstrat[ed]
156
a continuing disregard for the law.”
However, the court went on to
discuss the “sliding scale” of statutory damages and implied that a
maximum damage award of $150,000 per song (for willful infringement)
157
would likely deter Sonolux and other potential infringers.
When a prospective infringer realizes that the damages he or she
would be liable for are limited to one maximum statutory award, he or
she may be more willing to take the risk of getting caught for infringing
the work. In essence, infringers can use a “cost-benefit analysis and
determine whether infringing will be profitable even if they are
158
caught.”
Assuming that on remand, the court awards the statutory
maximum of $150,000 for each infringed song for a total of $300,000, is
this amount likely to deter Sonolux or other prospective infringers? I
159
would argue that the answer to this question is “no.”
Id.
154. See Yurman Design, Inc. v. P.A.J., Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[S]tatutory damages are not meant to be merely compensatory or restitutionary. The
statutory award is also meant ‘to discourage wrongful conduct.’ That is why the statute
permits consideration of . . . additional damages where an infringement is willful.” (internal
citations omitted)); see also 1961 REPORT, supra note 153, at 103 (noting that statutory
damages were intended “(1) to assure adequate compensation to the copyright owner for his
injury, and (2) to deter infringement”).
155. See Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 195.
156. Id. at 196.
157. Id. at 195–96. The court also stated that the district court’s intent is unclear from
the first order:
That language may well mean that the first judge was primarily concerned with the
total damages, the $1,600,000, as the sum that would reflect a just award in light of
defendant’s willfulness and would discourage future infringement. Because the
intent of the original order is not clear, we think on remand plaintiffs should be free
to argue to the district court that the statutory cap of $150,000 per song, in light of
seventeen infringing works (including the album “Sentimientos”) and the willful
conduct. The $200,000 award will serve as a damages floor on remand.
Id. at 196.
158. Thea, supra note 4, at 489. For example, if a large corporation such as Sonolux
will make a $50 million profit on an album that contains two infringed songs, the benefit
outweighs the cost of $300,000 in statutory damages ($150,000 per song).
159. Rafael Venegas would likely agree that this amount is unlikely to deter a large
corporation such as Sonolux. As he has pointed out, Sonolux is a member of the Recording
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Suppose, in a hypothetical example, that a “starving” artist’s
painting was infringed by a national art gallery. The gallery displayed
the painting at six different exhibits across the country. What amount of
statutory damages would the artist be entitled to under the multiplicity
doctrine versus the post–1976 infringed work interpretation?
Assume that the national gallery has locations in over twenty-five
cities and has gross profits of approximately $10 million per year.
Further, assume that the six galleries that displayed the starving artist’s
painting at different exhibits did so five months apart. Finally, assume
that the gallery was well aware that it was, in fact, infringing the artist’s
painting. Under the multiplicity doctrine, a court would likely consider
the gross profits ($10 million per year) and the size of the gallery
(twenty-five locations across the nation) and award a larger statutory
damage award than it would if the gallery was local and barely made a
160
profit each year.
A court would also likely consider the proximity in
time of the repeated infringements and the heterogeneity of the
161
Because the
infringements under the multiplicity doctrine.
infringements occurred in separate cities five months apart, a court
would likely award damages for each of the six exhibits. Finally, a court
would consider the “willfulness” of the infringements under the
162
multiplicity doctrine.
Assuming that the judge finds the gallery’s
infringements to be “willful,” a court would likely award the starving
artist the maximum statutory damage award of $150,000 for each
infringing work, that is, $900,000. I would argue that this amount is
large enough to deter the gallery from further infringing activity in
accordance with the deterrence goal of copyright law.
Now assume that the same hypothetical example occurs in a
jurisdiction that has abolished the multiplicity doctrine. Under the
independent economic value test, a court is not likely to find that each
of the six exhibits that displayed the painting can live its own copyright
163
life.
Thus, assuming that a court finds the gallery’s infringements
willful, the maximum amount of statutory damages it could award is
Industry Association of America (RIAA), an organization that has filed several lawsuits
against people for downloading and sharing songs for which they could be liable for up to
$150,000 per song. He asks: “[W]hy would any judge give RIAA an award of $150,000
against a kid (or the parent) for downloading or sharing a single song when a major record
label/corporation has to pay only $12,500 for making a record that sold over 5 million
copies?” Venegas, supra note 148.
160. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
161. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
162. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
163. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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$150,000. Not only is a maximum potential statutory damage award of
$150,000 not likely to deter the gallery from infringing the starving
artist’s or other artists’ paintings in the future, it is also unlikely that the
artist would be able to find a lawyer willing to take a case that would
likely cost up to $100,000 to litigate. Thus, while the result under the
multiplicity doctrine furthers the deterrence goal of copyright law, the
result in a jurisdiction that has abolished the multiplicity doctrine fails to
do so and may leave the copyright owner without the resources to
pursue an action against the infringer.
B. The Multiplicity Doctrine Promotes Good Public Policy
How, then, can copyright owners in jurisdictions that have abolished
the multiplicity doctrine, such as the plaintiffs in Venegas-Hernandez,
receive multiple statutory damage awards? Professor Nimmer has
cautioned that the only option seems to be that plaintiffs must file
165
separate actions for each claim of infringement to any one work. This
option would be wasteful in the interests of judicial economy, and courts
are likely to interpret the 1976 Act in such a manner as to reduce the
166
number of infringement actions that plaintiffs may bring. The court in
Venegas-Hernandez acknowledged and dismissed Professor Nimmer’s
concerns about the potential filing of multiple lawsuits to receive
multiple statutory damage awards that could occur as a result of the
167
abolition of the multiplicity doctrine.
Instead, the court relied on
Professor Goldstein’s assertion that the strategy of filing multiple
lawsuits to receive multiple statutory damage awards would be “both
168
procedurally and practically implausible”:
[I]n the ordinary case involving a continuing infringement,
the copyright owner will want to seek temporary and final
injunctive relief; if the copyright owner prevails, this will forestall
any future infringements and will circumscribe the copyright
owner’s statutory damage award by all infringements occurring
before the injunction entered. In any event, the rare copyright
164. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
165. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.04[E][2][c]. “It may be wondered
whether the courts will require a plaintiff to undertake the charade of filing separate actions
(based upon separate infringing transactions) in order to achieve multiple statutory
damages.” Id.
166. See id. at n.164.1 (providing examples of courts construing the Copyright Act in
such a manner as to reduce the number of infringement actions that need to be brought).
167. See Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 193–94 (1st Cir. 2004).
168. Id. at 194 n.9 (quoting 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 12.2.2.2(a) (2d ed.
2003)).
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owner who pursues this route should expect to receive a smaller
statutory award in its successive actions that if it sought to
169
recover for these infringements in a single action.
However, the “rare copyright owner” who does go through the
charade of filing multiple lawsuits to receive multiple statutory damage
awards is still wasting the valuable and increasingly scarce resources of
the courts. Reinstating the multiplicity doctrine would put an end to
this waste and promote good public policy.
Furthermore, the multiplicity doctrine promotes good public policy
because it does not result in exorbitant damages awards. Pre–1976, the
biggest critics of the multiplicity doctrine were the users of copyrighted
material, such as the radio, television, advertising and motion picture
industries, who feared that they would be hit with multimillion-dollar
170
statutory damages awards. This has not proven to be true, however, as
courts that have elected to use the multiplicity doctrine post–1976 have
171
taken special care not to award exorbitant damages. For example, in
172
Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, the court held that the defendant’s
three successive publications of a group of copyrighted photographs
constituted three separate infringements, noting that an award based on
one dollar per copy of the magazine would result in a multi-million
173
dollar recovery for the plaintiff that would be “excessive.” Thus, post–
1976 courts that have used the multiplicity doctrine to award statutory
damages have done so with an amount large enough only to deter the
defendants from further infringement, not bankrupt them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment is to illustrate the effects of the
abolition of the multiplicity doctrine on the deterrence goal of copyright
law in cases concerning multiple infringements of a copyrighted work.
Courts’ interpretations of the word “work” can result in substantial
differences in the amount of statutory damages awards—differences
that may influence prospective infringers to either continue or refrain
from future infringement. Prospective infringers who engage in a costbenefit analysis are likely to find that, under current law, the benefits of

169. Id.
170. See 1961 REPORT, supra note 153, at 104.
171. See, e.g., Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, 620 F. Supp. 792, 800 (D.D.C. 1985),
rev’d on other grounds, 800 F.2d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
172. 620 F. Supp. at 792.
173. Id. at 800.
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infringing outweigh the costs.
To further the deterrence goal of copyright law, courts should return
to the infringing work interpretation under the multiplicity doctrine and
consider the gross profits and size of the infringer’s business, the time
and heterogeneity of the infringements, and the willfulness of the
defendant’s conduct as factors in computing statutory damage awards.
Under the multiplicity doctrine, larger statutory damage awards are
likely to result when necessary to deter prospective infringement, that is,
a case in which a large corporation has made a substantial amount of
money from the infringements and has no other incentive not to
infringe. Thus, copyright law will once again serve to protect copyright
owners’ exclusive rights to their works in accordance with the United
States Constitution.
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